How we hold the keys that hold everything.

The three update-signing keys — release, security, and operations — are the single most consequential secrets the project owns. If any one of them is recovered by an attacker, the three-signature update protocol still holds because the other two refuse to co-sign. But if all three were ever in the same place at once, the protocol would collapse.

The ceremony exists to make sure no single human, system, or facility ever touches more than one of the three.

• Generate or rotate a role key: 3 of 5 officers
• Sign a release manifest: each role key signs individually under its own M-of-N
• Reconstitute after officer turnover: 4 of 5 officers + witness
• Emergency revocation (any role): 2 of 3 senior officers + recorded justification

• Officers (5 named, per role). Hold smart cards. Travel separately. Only meet for the ceremony.
• Witness (1). Reads the script aloud. Has no key material. Signs the witness log alongside the officers.
• Operator (1). Runs the HSM. Has no smart card. Audited inside and outside the room.

The ceremony machine is a hardware-attested workstation that has never been on a network, sealed in tamper-evident bags between events, opened only on camera.

checklist☐ Room sweep for radios (Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cellular, NFC)
☐ Faraday bag enclosure verified
☐ Camera rolling, room recording
☐ Officers identified — photo, smart card present, NDA signed
☐ Operator verified separately
☐ Tamper-evident bag opened on camera
☐ HSM checksum read aloud and matched against the witness log
☐ Script read aloud at each step
☐ Final hash printed and signed by all attendees
☐ Sealed tamper-evident bag, re-secured

A single A4 page, paper, signed by every attendee. Filed in the company safe with a sealed envelope containing the HSM checksum. Photographed and cross-published to two physically separate locations.

• Release key: every 12 months, plus on any officer departure
• Security key: every 12 months
• Operations key: every 18 months
• Intermediate signing keys: every 6 months (no full ceremony — operator only)

The previous-generation key remains valid for 14 days for staged rollover. After 14 days, it is revoked in the public registry and any device that still trusts it enters degraded mode.

The project plans for four loss patterns:

• Officer unreachable. 3-of-5 is enough; we proceed.
• Officer compromise suspected. Immediate emergency revocation; new officer recruited inside 30 days.
• Facility loss. A geographically separate backup site can run the same ceremony with the same officers.
• Multiple officer loss. The 4-of-5 reconstitution ceremony adds a witness. If this fails, the role itself is rebuilt from public attestation.